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CURRENT LEGISLATION
(4) (a)) and the three month priority rule (section 9-312(2)) on the farmer's
financial dealings with his creditors will be more ascertainable after the
amendment has had time to operate. Similarly, only time will tell if the de-
letion of section 9-204(2) (a) is really, as the foregoing analysis suggests,
inconsequential. The infinite potential in the law for novel fact situations




On October 15, 1962, Congress enacted into law an amendment' to
Section 9(a) of the Census Bureau Reports Act. 2 The amendment specifi-
cally provides that no department, bureau, or agency of the government,
other than the Department of Commerce, shall have access to copies of census
reports retained by the reporting companies." The effect of this amendment
is to extend to the company-retained copies of census reports the same im-
munity from legal process previously accorded only to the original reports
which had been submitted to the Census Bureau solely for statistical pur-
poses.
The amendment was precipitated by the United States Supreme Court
decision in St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States? Prior to this decision, three
lower federal court decisions,' a presidential proclamation,' an Attorney
1
 Pub. L. No. 87-813 (Oct. 15, 1962).
2 13 U,S.C. § 9 (1958).
3 13 U.S.C. § 131 (1958) provides that a census of manufacturing shall be taken,
compiled and published every five years. 13 U.S.C. § 224 (1958) imposes a fine of $500
or imprisonment for not more than sixty days or both upon the owner, official, agent or
person in charge of any company who, when requested, neglects or refuses to answer com-
pletely and correctly to the best of his knowledge all questions relating to his company
contained in any census form.
4 368 U.S. 208 (1961). The Federal Trade Commission subpoenaed certain corporate
records of the St. Regis Paper Co. in connection with its investigation of St. Regis for
possible violations of the antitrust laws. When the Commission found that the informa-
tion supplied was not sufficient for a finding, an order was issued to require the produc-
tion of other corporate records including file copies of reports previously submitted to the
Census Bureau. St. Regis claimed that such reports were confidential and refused to turn
them over to the Commission. The United States, at the request of the Commission,
brought suit in the district court seeking a mandatory injunction to compel compliance
with its order.
5 FTC v. Dilger, 276 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1960) ; FTC v. Orton, 175 F. Supp. 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 21 F.R.D. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
The Bethlehem court held that the privileged status was accorded the information fur-
nished to the Census Bureau and not merely the reports.
6 46 Stat. 3011 (1929). President Hoover, following the enactment of the Census
Bureau Reports Act, proclaimed:
The sole purpose of the census is to secure general statistical information regarding
the population and resources of the country, and replies are required from individu-
als only to permit the compilation of such general statistics. No person can be
harmed in any way by furnishing the information required.
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General's Opinion,' and the very language of the census form itself' re-en-
forced the reasonably held belief that company file copies were extended
the same confidentiality and immunity from legal process as were afforded
the original reports submitted to the Census Bureau. However, Mr. Justice
Clark, speaking for the majority in St. Regis, interpreted section 9 immunity
to apply only to original Bureau reports when he stated that "the prohibitions
against disclosure contained in §9 run only against the officials receiving
such information and do not purport to generally clothe census information
with secrecy."9
The impact of the St. Regis decision was immediately manifest. Both
government and industry depend upon reliable statistical reporting of highly
confidential data for predicting economic trends and planning for the future.
The success of the reporting program is predicated upon the fact that busi-
nesses can offer data freely and voluntarily without fear that the reported
information will be used against the reporting establishment. With the cloak
of immunity removed from the company-retained copies, Census Bureau
operations were immediately hindered. Reporting companies, rather than
subject their file copies to the possibility of disclosure, destroyed them,
severing the continuity so essential to uniform and consistent reporting over
successive reporting periods.° Due to the loss of faith by businesses in the
Government's assurances of immunity," the number of responses immediately
decreased.' 2
 Recognizing the detrimental aspects of the St. Regis case on the
Census Bureau's reporting program, Secretary of Commerce Hodges, in re-
questing that Congress abrogate the effects of the decision by amending Sec-
tion 9 of the Census Bureau Reports Act, pointed out that the success of the
program would be undermined unless immediate legislative action were
taken.'' Congress responded by enacting the amendment under discussion.
Undeniably, governmental departments must have access to certain cor-
porate records in order to detect, prevent and prosecute violations of the law.
However, the benefits derived from reliable statistical reporting warrant a
grant of immunity to both Bureau and company-retained copies, though
governmental departments are obliged to seek their information elsewhere.
Without such immunity to both copies of the reports, the basic purpose 14
underlying the Census Bureau Reports Act would be defeated.
Had the effect of the St. Regis decision not been counteracted, the result
7 36 Ops. Att'y Gen. 366 (1930).
8
 The census report form contains assurance of immunity by providing that: "Your
report is confidential and only sworn census employees will have access to it. It cannot
be used for the purpose of taxation, investigation or regulation." The file copy recites
that said copy is to be retained by the reporting company for future reference.
9
 Supra note 4, at 217-18. In a vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Black attacked the
majority's strict interpretation of the scope of immunity provided by section 9 and
asserted that it was Congress' intention to have all copies, both Bureau and company-
retained, accorded the immunity.
10 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5122, 5124 (Nov. 5, 1962).
11 Supra notes 6, 7 & 8.
12 Supra note 10.
13 Ibid.
14 See supra note 6.
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would have been a reduction in the accuracy of the statistics and an increase
in the cost of obtaining the vital information." The amendment alleviates
the adverse effects of the St. Regis case by restoring to businesses an assur-
ance of confidentiality in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Census
Bureau Reports Act.
STATE
The Massachusetts legislature recently enacted into law a statute im-
posing identification and marking requirements upon the sale of certain goods
imported from foreign countries." This statute prohibits the sale or offering
for sale of any "machinery, hardware, ladders, shoes or other footwear,
fabrics, suits or other wearing apparel, sporting goods or equipment, radios
or parts thereof, scallops, fish or fish products, which have been imported
from a foreign country" unless such goods are conspicuously identified as
"imported goods" by a sign displayed in a place where it can give adequate
notice to prospective purchasers of their foreign origin." In addition, if the
goods have an individual price marking, the statute requires that the goods
themselves be marked with the words "imported goods" or the name of the
country of origin." There is a reasonable basis for questioning the constitu-
tional validity of this statute.
Any discussion of the constitutionality of a state statute must necessarily
involve the jurisdiction of the state legislature to enact such a measure.
There are three specific instances in which a state legislature is devoid of
jurisdiction to legislate.
First, where a state act conflicts with a constitutional federal statute, the
former must yield since the federal law is supreme." The Massachusetts act
requires the posting of a sign reading "imported goods," and if the goods
15 Supra. note 10.
18 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 2778 (Supp. 1962).
17 Under the statute, the letters in the sign stating "imported goods" must he at
least as large as the price figures. The new law also prohibits the advertising of these
goods unless the advertisement specifically designates that they have been imported. Ex-
cluded from liability under this provision are newspaper publishers, owners and operators
of radio and television stations and other persons furnishing a medium for advertising
for the sale of such goods.
18 The additional marking provision states that "If the goods have an individual
price marking [e.g., price tag], then in like manner, they shall also be marked with the
words 'Imported Goods' or the country of origin indicated." (Emphasis supplied.)
Whether "they" refers to "price marking" or to "goods" is ambiguous. Since both "they"
and "goods" are plural and "price marking" is singular, the logical construction is that
"they" refers to "goods."
10 U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2 provides "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-
stitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." See McDermott v.
Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913) which held a Wisconsin statute repugnant to the com-
merce clause where it conflicted with the Federal Food and Drug Act (34 Stat. 768
(1906) (now 52 Stat. 1059 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1958)) by requiring the labeling of
glucose mixtures brought into the state in accordance with the state labeling statute and
prohibiting all other labels on the container, including that required by the federal
statute. Compare Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912) which upheld a state labeling
law as not being in conflict with the federal statute.
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have an individual price marking, the statute requires that the specific goods
be marked. The federal statute also requires the actual labeling of goods."
The purpose underlying both the federal and the Massachusetts statutes
appears to be to notify prospective purchasers of the foreign origin of the
goods and to thereby influence their will in deciding whether or not to pur-
chase the imported goods.21
 Hence, although the Massachusetts act provides
a supplementary means of notification, the respective statutes do not con-
flict either as to method of, or purpose for, the identification of imported
goods.
However, the Massachusetts act does conflict with the federal statute in
another respect. The federal regulations exempt certain classes of imported
goods from the marking requirements, e.g., products exported from the United
States and returned, 22 and parcels containing articles under one dollar in
value.23
 The Massachusetts act conflicts with the federal regulations in that
it requires the marking of some federally exempted goods including the
aforesaid. As to these conflicting provisions, the Massachusetts act appears
to be invalid.
Second, a state act is invalid where it is merely duplicative of a federal
statute in an area demanding uniform regulation. 24 The justification for
invalidating the coincidental state measure is that the dual regulatory system
often creates an overlapping and confusing menace which destroys the uni-
formity for which Congress may have enacted the regulation." The Massa-
chusetts act, to the extent that it requires the marking of the imported goods,
duplicates the federal requirements in this area. A similar situation arose in
the case of Hines v. Davidouritz,26 wherein both a Pennsylvania statute and
a federal statute imposed identical alien registration requirements. Mr.
Justice Black, speaking for the majority, struck down the Pennsylvania
statute, stating that the ultimate question of constitutionality of the state
law depends upon whether, under the circumstances of the particular case,
the state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress. And in that determina-
tion, it is of importance that this legislation is in a field which affects
international relations, the one aspect of our government that from
the first has been most generally conceded imperatively to demand
broad national authority. 27
20 67 Stat. 509 (1953), 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1958).
21 This purpose of the federal marking regulations was clearly defined by the Court
of Custom and Patent Appeals in United States v. Friedlaender, 27 C.C.PA. 297 (1940).
22 19 C.F.R. § 11.10(b)(4) (1961).
23 19 C.F.R. § 11.10(b) (5) (1961). See 19 C.F.R. § 11.10 (1961) for a complete list
of articles exempted from the federal marking requirements.
24 Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604
(1915), wherein Mr. Justice Holmes stated that "When Congress has taken the particular
subject-matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not
to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go."
26 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
241 Ibid.
27 Id. at 67-68.
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The enforcement of the Massachusetts act under consideration will impede
the purposes and objectives of Congress in the area of international relations
and foreign trade. With respect to trade with foreign nations, it is imperative
that the federal government maintain a uniform commercial policy? 8 Massa-
chusetts has legislated one set of marking regulations for foreign products.
Conceivably, the other forty-nine states could establish their own diverse
requirements. It is manifest that such diverse marking requirements would
constitute an undue burden on the conduct of our national trade policy,
seriously impairing the strength of our foreign trade program.
However, the Supreme Court in certain cases has made exceptions and
upheld duplicative measures, especially in the area of traffic safety regulation
which is considered a valid exercise of the states' police power over a subject
predominantly local in scope?° The cases which have upheld overlapping
state statutes dealt with a legislative area totally unrelated to the subject
under consideration and, therefore, cannot be used as a basis for upholding
the Massachusetts act.
Finally, the state lacks jurisdiction to legislate in an area in which
Congress has preempted or "occupied the field."80 Whether Congress has
preempted the field can be determined from its intent to preclude state action
in the particular area.31 Such an intent may be indicated by the terms of
the federal act.82 Frequently, however, congressional intent to preempt the
field does not appear in the language of the statute itself. The United States
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 33 faced with the issue of whether
Congress had preempted the field of sedition, indicated that congressional
intent may be determined by answering the following queries: First, does the
federal statute touch a field in which the national interest is so dominant that
the federal system must be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject? Second, would state administration of the law interfere
with, and present a danger to the federal program? Third, is the federal
28 Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill, v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933). The
need for a uniform legal standard among the states concerning the importation of foreign
goods has influenced the Supreme Court to adhere to the policy that only Congress may
determine what articles are to be imported into this country, and the terms upon which
such importation is permitted. For cases following this view, see Weber v. Freed, 239
U.S. 325 (1915) ; Brolan v. United States, 236 U.S. 216 (1915) ; The Abby Dodge, 223
U.S. 166 (1912) ; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
29 See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949), where the Court, by a bare majority,
held that the Federal Motor Carrier Act (49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 54 Stat. 919,
921 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 301, 303(b) (1958)) did not prevent California from imposing
overlapping regulatory measures prohibiting the sale and arrangement of any transporta-
tion over the state's public highways unless such carriers had been issued a permit from
either the state or the Interstate Commerce Commission. The area of traffic safety regula-
tion is considered a proper subject for the exercise of the state police power. See Maurer
v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) ; South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). In addition, the Court in Zook stressed the fact that Congress
in enacting the federal statute, did not appear to intend to preclude state legislation on
the same subject.
30 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) ; New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield,
244 U.S. 147 (1917).
31 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra note 30.
32 Southern Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n of Ind., 236 U.S. 439 (1915).
33 Supra note 30.
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scheme of regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it? Affirmative answers
to the foregoing questions would reasonably lead to the conclusion that
Congress has intended to preempt the field.
Mr. Jusice Curtis in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Phila. 34
first set forth the test of preclusion with the question: Is this a field pre-
dominantly national in character or is it sufficiently local to warrant diverse
local regulation? It is immediately apparent upon examination of the area
of marking of foreign imports that we are dealing with a subject of paramount
national importance which, as previously indicated, demands a uniform
national system of regulation.
In the fifty years prior to the enactment of the Massachusetts act,
Congress, pursuant to the express authority granted to it by the Constitu-
tion," has enacted a pervasive scheme of regulation in the area of marking
and labeling imported goods. The conclusion is inescapable that Congress
intended to preclude supplementary legislation by the states. The compre-
hensive federal statute expressly provides that
every article of foreign origin (or its container) ... imported into
the United States shall be marked in a conspicuous place as legibly,
indelibly and permanently as the nature of the article (or container)
will permit in such a manner as to indicate to an ultimate purchaser
in the United States the English name of the country of origin of
the article." (Emphasis supplied.)
Congressional intent to enact an all-encompassing measure is further indicated
in the terms of the statute which vests the Secretary of the Treasury with
discretionary authority to impose supplementary regulations necesssary to
prevent deception or mistake in the marking and labeling of foreign articIes. 37
Thus, Congress has manifested its intent to preempt the field of marking and
labeling of imports by legislating a pervasive scheme of regulation in an area
which is dominantly federal in interest and in which state action would
endanger the federal program.
Therefore, it would seem that Massachusetts lacked jurisdiction to enact
the statute in question on at least two grounds: first, the Massachusetts act
is coincident with the federal statute in an area of national significance and,
second, Congress "occupies the field" of marking and labeling imports. Even
if it could be assumed that the Massachusetts act were valid, it appears to be
invalid to the extent that its provisions conflict with the federal regulations.
The constitutional validity of the Massachusetts act must further be
questioned on the basis of its discriminatory purposes and effects. The com-
merce clause of the Constitution was interpreted in Welton v. Missourin to
34 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
35 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 provides that "Congress shall have the Power to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States and with the
Indian Tribes."
35 Supra note 20. Section 1304(d) prohibits delivery to any market until such goods
are marked accordingly.
al 19 U.S.C. §§ 1304(a) (1) & (2) (1958).
3S 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
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forbid the imposition of burdens by a state upon interstate or foreign com-
merce if unreasonable or discriminatory. The object of vesting the federal
government with the exclusive power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the states was to insure uniformity of regulation in order
to prevent the discriminatory type of state legislation which existed prior to
the adoption of the Constitution.°
However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the states, in the
exercise of their police power, must be permitted to enact measures for the
protection of their citizens' health and safety." Therefore, in each case that
has come before it involving discriminatory legislation, the Supreme Court
has examined the burden which the statute in question placed upon commerce
and measured this against the interest which the state law sought to protect;
and where the Court has determined that the state's interest in protecting its
citizens has outweighed the national interest in maintaining a free flow of
commerce, the statute has been sustained.'" However, the Supreme Court
in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison 42 altered this test when it declared that
even where the state enacted a valid measure to protect the health of its
citizens, if the statute overly burdened commerce or discriminated against
out-of-state producers, it would be struck down unless the local interests
could be protected in no other way." The Court was clear in its view,
moreover, that protection of the local economy is not considered a valid
exercise of the state's police power and that where a state statute is enacted
primarily for the purpose of erecting economic barriers and not for the pur-
pose of protecting the health and welfare of its citizens, the statute will not
be upheld:"
There have been exceptional cases where protective economic measures
designed to reach a local situation in the interest of the welfare of producers
and consumers have been upheld by the Supreme Court. In Milk Control Bd.
v. Eisenberg Farm Prods.,43 a Pennsylvania statute required that milk dealers
obtain a license to operate, file a bond and pay producers milk prices set by
the board. The Supreme Court, in upholding the law, stressed three factors:
the activity affected was essentially local, very little milk was shipped out of
state, and no attempt was made to curtail out-of-state shipments. But note,
unlike the Massachusetts act, the Pennsylvania statute did not discrimina-
torily affect out-of-state interests. In fact, the effects of the law only
• negligibly extended beyond the state borders.
39
 E.P. Hood Sr Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
40 Bradley v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 289 U.S. 92 (1933) (denial of a license
to run a bus line upheld where the issuance of the license would have crowded the high-
ways and endangered the safety of the citizens) ; Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1932)
(New York statute requiring certification by the state of origin that cattle shipped from
out of state were inspected by sanitary officials against Bang's disease, upheld) ; Reid v.
Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902) (Colorado statute making it unlawful to bring diseased
cattle into the state, upheld).
41 Ibid.
42 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
43 Id. at 354.
44 mid. Accord, H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, supra note 39; Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) ; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890).
306 U.S. 346 (1939).
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Many of the foreign products designated by the Massachusetts statute to
be conspicuously distinguished from goods of domestic origin are the same pro-
ducts which are manufactured by the state's most important, yet ailing
industries. Local labor unions and manufacturers have been demanding
additional protection against increasing foreign competition within the state.
The Massachusetts act appears to be an attempt to satisfy these pleas by
providing measures designed to influence the general buying public to purchase
domestic products in lieu of similar foreign goods. But in attempting to guide
the choice of the purchasing public for the purpose of protecting the
local economy, the statute unconstitutionally discriminates against foreign
producers.
The regulations imposed by the Massachusetts act, unlike those in the
Eisenberg case, will produce extra-territorial burdens on foreign producers.
Since the effects of the economic regulation will be felt outside of Massachu-
setts, it cannot be declared a valid exercise of the state police power. While
in many respects, additional measures may be required to adequately inform
the public that certain goods are imported, this is strictly a function of the
federal government. For only the Government possesses the requisite power
to enact such economically protective measures, to determine such policy,
and to take the appropriate action to accomplish the desired results.
In conclusion, the reasons for construing the Massachusetts act to be
unconstitutional are twofold. First, Massachusetts lacks the necessary juris-
diction to legislate in the area of marking foreign imports, for the legislation
is duplicative of the federal act and concerns an area of national interest
which has been constantly regulated under a uniform system by Congress,
and in which area Congress has manifested its intention to "occupy the
field." Further, the Massachusetts act is invalid to the extent that it con-
flicts with the federal statute by requiring the marking of certain classes of
goods which are exempt under federal law. Second, the Massachusetts act
appears to discriminate against foreign producers in an effort to protect local
economic interests, and thus the act places an unconstitutional burden on
foreign commerce.
NELSON G. Ross
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